Three of the named plaintiffs and school representatives in the House, Carter, and Hubbard antitrust lawsuits that preliminary settlements with U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken want the prosecutor to “lend” her “imprimatur” to support their purpose of a people ‘ organization and for players. nonprofit to serve as that relationship.
In their Dec. 2 email, Grant House, Sedona Prince and Nya Harrison acknowledge it is “unusual” for defendants to immediately call a prosecutor. Typically, claimants speak with a prosecutor through their legal counsel. Especially given the delicate nature of this situation, Wilken does decide whether to grant final approval to any conversation that offers a different perspective from what the lawyers have told her, which could make her question whether the clients and attorneys are on the same webpage.

House, Prince, and Harrison make an effort to dissuade that problem by humming the arrangement as a “monumental action” in reforming the” college sports ecosystem.” The group assert that they are concerned that school athletes will still be “limited in their ability to facilitate the changes we intended to make in school athletics.” House, Prince and Harrison add that Wilken, who likewise presided over EdO’Bannon and Shawne Alston’s historical cases against the NCAA, “has played a vital role” in “establishing and protecting the rights of college athletes” and so her thumbs upward would resonate in the lawful and sports communities.
To that end, House, Prince and Harrison want Wilken to endorse the need for a college players ‘ association. They believe Athletes. org “is the solution” since it has “nearly 4, 000 college athlete members” and helps those athletes “navigate critical issues like reviewing NIL agreements ]and ] agent verification” while “providing opportunities for our voices to be organized and heard”.
Although the letter has no bearing on the settlement, it is significant from a policy standpoint and shouldn’t be taken as a template or tool for the formation of a union.
On the one hand, Wilken will notice that House, Prince, and Harrison want college athletes to have official affiliations with their respective conferences, NCAA, and schools. As currently configured, the settlement contemplates billions of dollars in payments to former, current and future athletes. One feature involves the NCAA, schools, and conferences paying athletes$ 2.8 billion over a 10-year period as recompense for denying them NIL, video game, and broadcast opportunities in recent years. Another feature entails payments of athletes, capped by a salary cap-like ceiling of about$ 21 million, for all athletes in a program reflecting media rights, ticket sales sponsorships and NIL. There is also advice on whether NIL deals that exceed$ 600 should be subject to independent evaluation to ensure they aren’t cloaking pay-for-play deals.

Given that the new world of college sports is essentially pro sports with the added twist that athletes also have to balance their academic schedules, it makes sense that college athletes would want a group voice representing their interests. This is true for those in the NFL, NBA, WNBA, and other leagues. The attorneys ‘ objectives are to win the case or reach a favorable settlement ( one that would reimburse the attorneys fairly well through attorneys ‘ fees ) despite their attorneys ‘ representing views. The attorneys ‘ objectives are not necessarily to create a robust system for athletes to operate in a professional sports-like environment. In fact, one criticism raised by settlement objectors is that the attorneys have pledged to be impartial about whether college athletes are employees and whether they can bargain.
However, neither the settlement nor Judge Wilken can fulfill the athletes ‘ wishes. Conceptually, House, Prince and Harrison seek a union or a players ‘ association. Wilken cannot establish such a group of employees, which are required by labor law to submit a group of them to the NLRB or state labor board for recognition as a bargaining unit and to accompanying votes. Unions are not created by accident or by judicial decree. Instead, they must be created organically and in a series of steps, as permitted by applicable labor laws.
Save for Dartmouth men’s basketball players, college athletes have not been legally recognized as employees. Under labor law, that means other than Big Green players in Hanover N. H., college athletes can’t unionize. Even through the current legal proceedings, Wilken has no authority to alter that. Her only authority is to address the specific antitrust concerns raised in each of the three cases and to review the settlement to make sure it meets Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s standards for fairness, reasonableness, and adequate.
That’s it.
College athletes might sign up for an Athletes-based advocacy group. The College Football Players Association, the website, or a similar endeavor. These organizations can provide athletes with valuable benefits, including access to group licensing agreements, and give them a voice in front of lawmakers, business leaders, and other important constituents. These or other organizations might one day become labor organizations that are recognized by the National Labor Relations Board and state labor boards.

But as of now, those organizations are not unions. They can’t collectively bargain on behalf of athletes. That is important because, unless those rules are collectively agreed, colleges, conferences, and the NCAA cannot omit rules that restrict how they compete for athletes ( including those that apply to athlete pay ).
That’s not to say the letter is irrelevant. Wilken might express her opinion during a hearing or as part of a written order that college athletes require a more organized voice to defend their interests. It’s less likely that she’ll opine, without review of facts and legal arguments, that college athletes are or are not employees and should or should not unionize.
Wilken might also inquire at a settlement approval hearing whether the settlement is the best way to accomplish the objectives House, Prince, and Harrison express in their letter. That would provide another way to verify that the settlement is not just the lawyers ‘ concluding agreement without the client’s input. The players ‘ demands for a collective voice are far beyond the settlement, and the letter does this, which might give Wilken pause to ask whether they comprehend the limitations of the settlement and the framework it imposes.