Today’s host journalist is Ricardo Fort, chairman of Sport by Fort Consulting.
A consortium of renowned Brazilian football leagues convened in a chic hotel in So Paulo two years ago to discuss a project that would change the game’s course. That meeting was n’t their second, as team presidents had been in discussions 1- on- 1 and as a group for over a year, but was especially important. The presidents of Brazilian top clubs were going to commit to creating a national soccer league that was independent, professionally managed, and significantly more attractive than their British counterparts did about 30 years ago when they established the English Premier League ( EPL).
The Brazilian Football Federation ( CBF), which has for decades controlled the national championship’s execution and all its commercial aspects, would lose all control, give sponsorships, broadcast it, and give it exclusive control over ticketing, and bring in an investor to finance its launch and global expansion.

The possibilities of succeeding were higher than ever because of a series of related circumstances. Many clubs had professional presidents who understood the need to compromise their individual gains for a larger collective payout, and the CBF’s administration was in turmoil and did n’t have the political will to stop the movement. Importantly, new laws were passed that made it possible for global leagues and leagues to invest in each other.
They had a proven path chart in some of the best German leagues, improved match schedules for European and Asian broadcasters, increased the value of foreign TV rights, made more money in salaries to prevent teenage players from migrating to another wealthy leagues, signed more lucrative sponsorship deals with international brands thanks to their new and trustworthy management team, and persuade streaming companies to open their wallets and buy their fresh packages.
In the process, Campeonato Brasileiro would earn an additional$ 1.3 billion, putting it in line with only the EPL and LaLiga.
Without Brazil, the task might have been successful.
Fast forward 18 months, and the idealistic plan to create the new group has evaporated completely. Brazilian soccer wasted a once-in-a-generation opportunity to revolutionize home soccer for a complicated, petty, and myopic reason.
Second, to no one’s surprise, there was a debate on the income distribution requirements. The supporters ‘ plan was to imitate the earlier EPL years, reducing the income gap between the top- and bottom-of-the-table leagues from 9x to 3. 5x. This huge income distribution, a major sacrifice for the biggest clubs in the country, was received by the smaller ones with disdain. Instead, they demanded benchmarking to today’s EPL allocation, where the gap was near 1.8x.

Then there was plenty of self- serving nonsense.
Fluminense, the third largest club in the state of Rio de Janeiro, opted out, claiming that if the league was good for Flamengo ( their archrivals and the leaders of the movement to create the league ), it could n’t be good for them.
A well-run regional club in the south of Brazil, Athlético Paranaense, boycotted the league because their president argued with one of the league’s advisors ‘ families decades ago. He made a lot of effort to find other clubs outside the league for more than a year.
A selfish owner of one traditional club, realizing that he could get a bigger share of the profits if he brought in the investor to finance the creation of the league, branched out and persuaded a few more clubs to follow his lead.
A group of Second Division and mid-table clubs joined the opposition. The clubs were led by investors and advisors, who had questioned their motives, had numerous conflicts of interest, and were convinced they should rebel and demand a much bigger piece of the pie from league clubs despite having an unmatched fan base that was much smaller. Each side made their own decision because the gap was too large to close. There was a lot of misinformation and promises of unachievable gains throughout the ugly battle.
On the surface, the anti- league faction appears victorious, with the league yet to materialize ( at the time of writing ). However, outcomes vary among groups. Pro- league clubs brokered a groundbreaking deal, selling their collective media rights to Globo, Brazil’s largest broadcaster, ensuring a substantial increase in media revenues for the next four seasons.
Conversely, the “against” clubs now confront the harsh reality of meager offerings. Excluded from Globo’s patronage, they are left to lower- budget free- to- air networks, low- reaching streaming platforms, influencer collaborations, or launching their own over- the- top ( OTT ) service. None of these alternatives, even when combined, will deliver their current earnings. Thus, their feuds and trivial disagreements only result in lower revenues.
Today, the dream of a league is highly unlikely but not impossible. This is undisputed: The system has made a unique goal that will halt Brazil’s soccer industry’s growth for years to come.
As the only executive to lead the Global Sponsorship Departments of two FIFA and IOC sponsors—Visa and Coca- Cola—Fort negotiated over a billion dollars in sponsorships with the IOC, FIFA, UEFA, the Special Olympics, athletes and McLaren F1 team, among others. In 2021, he launched Sport by Fort Consulting, which helps sponsors, leagues, investors and athletes invest in sports.